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The presumption  that fixed-rate  debt is, in general,  less risky
than flexible-rate  debt is historically  inaccurate.  In some  com-
mon circumstances,  flexible-rate  borrowing actually reduces
net risk - whether debt service payments are indexed to
nominal  interest rates or to inflation  in industrial  countries.
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This paper - a product of the Intemational  Economic  Analysis  and Prospects  Division,  International
Econorncs Department  - is part  of a larger  effort in the department  to understand  the links between  the
international  economic  environment  and the growth  process  in developing  countries.  Copies  of the paper
are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact
Jacquelyn  Queen, room S8-216,  extension  33740  (September  1993,  35 pages).
Can developing  countries  affect the variance  of  The worst-case  scenario  for developing
real imports  solely by altering  the way debt  countries  is flexible  interest rate borowing
service  is paid? The answer,  says Warner,  is a  combined  with monetary  contraction  in the
qualified  yes.  industrial  world,  which raises nominal  interest
rates,  reduces  inflation,  and wors,ns the terms of
-Te presumption  thiat  fixed-rate  debt is less  trade of developing  countries.  To the extent that
risky  than flexible-rate  debt  is historically  developing  countries  want to avoid  this scenario,
inaccurate  as a general proposition.  Using  annual  borrowing  at either fixed interest  rates or infla-
data for 1970-90,  Warner  shows that for many  tion-indexed  rates would  be preferable  to bor-
developing  countries,  flexible-rate  borrowing  rowing  at flexible  nominal  interest rates.
actually  reduced  net risk  - whether  debt service
payments  were indexed  to nominal interest  rates  To reduce risk, countries  should  seek debt
or to inflation  in industrial  countries.  The  contracts  in which  debt service  payments  vary
covaiiance  terms are larger and more  often  positively  with their terns of trade.  Results
positive  with inflation  than with nominal  interest  indicate  that inflation-indexed  debt is most
rates.  desirable  on this score.
Wamer presents a macro-model  of the  Warner  examines  only extreme  options,  with
industrial  countries  to organize  thoughts  about  all debt of one type.  The optimal  strategy  would
the comovements  of these  variables  in response  probably  entail all three kinds of borrowing.
to shocks.  The termns  of trade of developing  And the paper  does not examine  options for
countries  are linked to this model by the assump-  efficient  intemational  ri-k-sharing.
tion that the level of demand  in industrial
countries  positively  affects  the terms of trade of
developing  countries.
ThnPrSedhe  Policy  Research  DaperSeiesdissernianaes  diefindings  of wo  Ckunder  wayin therBanL  Anobjoctveof the  saies
is to Set these findings out quiclcly, even if presentations are less dhv  fully polished.  The findings,  intMetatiom  nsud
conclusions in these papers do not necessaily  represent of  ficial Bank policy.
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Should risk averse sovereign debtors borrow at fixed or flexible rates?  And if borrowing at
flexible  rates, rather than paying a fixed premium over a nominal interest rate like LIBOR,  would it be
in the interests  of the country to pay instead a fixe-d  premium over the inflation  rate in the currency of
the lending  bank?
These questions  have gained renewed  importance  as several debtors have already  shifted, or are
now  actively  considering  a shift from flexible  to fixed rate debt. This shift is motivated  by the belief that
fixed rate borro"'ing is less risky than flexible rate borrowing, and that in particular, it helps insure
debtors against  a repeat of 1982, when the combination  of flexible  rate borrowing,  high nominal interest
rates, and declining  terms  of trade helped precipitate  the debt crisis. At issue  is whether  this presumption
is warranted after framing the question in a more general framework  that does not exclusively  rely on
the 1982 example.
Consider briefly the choice between fixed interest rate debt and flexible interest rate debt.  To
decide the issue for a given country, it would be helpful, although perhaps infeasible,  to know both the
future path of nominal interest rates and the covariance between interest rates and other sources of
income. For concreteness, assume that the country desires both low debt service payments  and a low
variance  of its real purchasing  power over imports. The future  path of interest  rates matters  because  one
may wish to lock in now if rates are temporarily  low, and borrow at flexible  rates if they are temporarily
high.  The covariance matters because  if it is -2sitve  and sufficiently  large, then floating rate debt can
actually reduce the overall variance  of real imports, and in this sense be less risky than fixed rate debt.
The purpose of this paper is to flag some of the relevant macroeconomic  issues and to provide
useful gu.delines  for policy makers dealing with these issues.
Since all recommendations  require  clarity about  the objectives,  this paper begins  by assuming  that
the objective is to minimize  the variance  of real purchasing  power over imports, although  some other
Iobjectives  are also considered. It is worth stating explicitly  that this objective  is best suited to the case
where countries have inherited  debt, and have little ability to borrow and lend on international  capital
markets to insulate real imports against the effects of temporary shocks.  Clearly if countries could
borrow freely, then borrowing  would be a simnpler  way to deal with temporary interest rate shocks and,
consequently,  the choice of debt contract would De  less importan.. The assumption  is also best suited  to
the case where countries  import  essential  intermediate  inputs ind capital  goods. In this situation, a shock
to interest payments  can also become  a supply  shock by compressing  essential  imports,  which would have
further ramifications  on the real side or the economy. However, both of these cases, limited access to
global credit markets, and a high intermediate  and capital goods content of imports, are arguably
important  facts that currently confront  developing  countries.
To place this paper in a wider context, it is part of a literature that looks at ways developing
countries can reduce their exposure to risk from fluctuating export prices.  There are three broad
approaches  to this problem.  The first is to seek ways to intervene  in the market to control export prices.
Examples include buffer stocks and funds, quotas and variable expo.  taxes.  There is already an
extensive literature  analyzing  and criticizing  these schemes  (see Newbery  and Stiglitz, 1981). A second
approach  is to make better and more extensive use of market mechanisms  for managing  risks, such as
insurance  markets, forward, futures and options  markets. But several  authors, (see Arrow, 1974), argue
that there are entrenched sources of  market failure that make replication not possible with Ulese
instruments  for developing  countries. A third alternative  is to design financial  instruments  that can serve
as hedging  instruments  in addition to their function as financing  instruments. Examples  include swaps,
commodity-linked  bonds  and indexed  variable rate loans. With the possible  exception  of the recent past,
developing  countries have not made full use of the range of feasible instruments.
Within this last alternative, the merits and demerits of commodity-linked  bonds have been
examined  by Meyers (1990). This scheme is best suited for countries whose exports are dominated  by
2homogenous  commodities. In the case where countries expurt a range of commodities  and where the
composition  changes  over time, it is less obvious how to implement  such a scheme.
To  avoid analyzing what the literature has already covered, this  paper does not consider
commodity-linked  bonds, and instead focusses on three options which are closer to what developing
courtriec are already Hoing  or at least closer in spirit.  The three options are, first, borrowing at fixed
interest  rates without  any indexing; second, indexing  to a nominal interest rate; and finally, indexing  to
an inflation  rate.  The last option is not commonly  considered, but the paper will show a case where it
can achieve better diversification than nominal interest rate indexing.  Essentially it  amounts to
guaranteeing  a fixed real interest rate to the creditor bank, since  the interest  rate paid can be set at a fixed
markup over inflation  in the home curreacy of the bank.
1. The Countries.
To provide an idea of the list of countries that such a question  woul  *e relevant for, table I
presents statistics on the amount of commercial  bank debt and variable rate debt.  The country list is
restricted  to countries  that owed at least 5 percent of their long term debt to commercial  banks in 1991.
The debt data are expressed in millions of US dollars.
3Table  1. The ;mportance  of Commercial  Bank  Debt  and Variable  Rate  Debt,  1991
Long  Term  Percent  to  Percent  at
COUNTRY  Debt (LDOD)  Commercial  Banks  Variable  Rates
AGO.ANGOLA  7370  10.3  6.5
ARG.ARGENTI  47188  49.0  58.3
BGR.BULGARI  11023  47.6  73.0
BOL.BOLIVIA  3676  9.8  24.2
BRA.BRAZIL  95130  54.3  71.8
BRB.BARBADO  483  37.3  24.6
CHL.CHILE  14744  60.4  76.6
CHN.CHINA  50502  29.4  33.1
CIV.COTE  DI  15167  48.9  65.7
CMR.CAMEROO  5254  11.0  18.7
COG.CONGO  3989  10.5  27.3
COL.COLOMBI  15617  33.7  50.6
CRI.COSTA  R  3620  8.9  32.1
CSK.CZECHOS  5846  43.0  33.3
CYP.CNPRUS  1513  28.0  31.0
DOM.DOMINIC  3554  24.2  31.5
DZA.ALGERIA  26557  20.0  41.6
ECU.ECUADOR  10094  50.0  61.0
FJI.FIJI  346  24.3  31.5
GAB.GABON  2935  6.2  10.2
GTM.GUATEMA  2230  12.3  16.8
GUY.GUYANA  1554  5.1  10.4
HND.HONDURA  2940  7.8  21.7
HTI.HAITI  609  7.6  0.7
HUN.  HUNGARY  19221  42.3  56.4
IDN.INDONES  59960  27.9  43.1
IND.INDIA  64315  13.3  21.0
IRN.IRAN,  1  2736  38.6  84.7
JAM.JAMAICA  3779  8.3  25.7
JOR.JORDAN  7570  15.9  28.2
KEN.KENYA  5776  27.1  20.2
KOR.KOREA,  29318  36.8  41.8
LBR.LIBERIA  1127  15.5  10.9
LKA.SRI  LAN  5758  6.9  5.6
MAR.MOROCCO  20332  16.6  52.5
MEX.MEXICO  83891  15.3  45.9
MUS.MAURITI  960  28.9  11.0
MYS.MALAYSI  18753  34.3  52.2
NER.NICER  1503  16.1  16.4
NGA.NIGERIA  33588  17.7  31.8
NIC.NICARAG  8703  14.9  25.9
OMN.OMAN  2270  71.3  59.6
PAN.PANAMA  3939  54.1  61.3
PER.PERU  15298  25.8  27.8
PHL.PHILIPP  25893  28.1  4,.7
PNG.PAPUA  N  2565  46.6  52.7
POL.POLAND  44057  23.1  67.7
PRT.PORTUGA  20170  46.0  27.0
PRY.PARAGUA  1800  16.6  16.8
SDN.SUDAN  9717  21.4  19.6
SLV.EL  SALV  2069  8.0  14.1
SYC.SEYCHEL  154  16.2  8.4
THA.THAILAN  23336  54.0  56.6
TTO.TRINIDA  1817  32.0  51.7
TUN.TUNISIA  7369  6.7  23.4
TUR.TURKEY  41135  33.2  35.5
URY.URUGUAY  3128  20.6  60.1
VEN.VENEZUE  28839  13.1  62.7
YUG.YUGOSLA  15872  56.5  75.1
ZAR.ZAIRE  9151  5.7  11,.3
7ur  7TURaDU  AR  ,R
Debt i,  measLred  in  millions  of 1991  U.S.  dollars. Sour^e:  World  Bank:  World  Debt Table.,  1992.2. When will flexible rate debt be less risky than fixed rate debt?
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It was mentioned  in the introduction  that flexible  rate debt may actuaily  be less risky than fixed
rate debt as long as the covariance  term is large enough  to overcome  the higher  variability  of flexible  rate
debt.  Of course, this may hold for either of the two kinds of flexible rate debt, nominal interest rate
indexed or intlation indexed, but the equations below are written for the case of nominal interest rate
indexing. This section derives a condition  on the covariance  term to gauge when flexible  rate borrowing
has a lower variance  that fixed rate borrowing, and then examines  data to determine  the extent to which
this criterion was satisfied  in the past.
First, let P  i  md Pm  represent aggregate  export and import price indexes  with 1987=1.0; let x
represent real expor:s in billions of 1987 dollars; let i and 8 represent the nominal interest rate on
outstanding  debt and the fraction of principal that is repaid each year; and let D renresent outstanding
debt in billions  of 19P7  dollars. Then the quantity  of real imports  that can be purchased  in a given year
without  borrowing  is simply:
P.X  D -x-  (i+6)-p
P.  P., 
To simplify the notation and the analysis  slightly, assume 0=0  and rewrite the expression as
follows.
z  = px  - id
Where p is the terms of trade, x is real imports, and d is real debt measured in terms of the
aggregate import good.  Taking exports and debt as pre-determined,  and the terms of trade and the
nominal interest rate as stochastic, the variance of real import purchases under flexible rate borrowing
would be:
5Var(px  - d)  = x2Vart.p) + d2Var(i)  - 2xdCov(p,i)
And the variance  under tixed interest rate borrowing would be:
Var(px  - id)  = x2Var(p)
Hence  flexible  rate borrowing  can achieve  a lower variance  of real impoa purchases wvhen
d2Var(Q) - 2xdCov(p,i)  < 0.
Re-writing  this condition, we have
Cov(p,a)  >  d  (6)
Var(i)  2x
To interpret  this condition, note first that the coefficient  from a simple bivariate regression  of the terms
of .rade on nominal interest rates provides an estimate of the left hand side; and the right hand side is
simply  one-half the debt to export ratio.  Hence  the condition states  that flexible  rate borrowing will be
less risky than fixed interest rate borrowing if the regression coefficient  is positive and exceeds  one half
the debt export ratio.
The next question is whether this condition has been satisfied in practice.  To  answer this
question, table 2 reports sample estimates of the left hand side of (6), denoted by #,  using both a
representative  nominal interest rate (Dollar LIBOR ' ate) and inflation (US inflation using the GDP
deflator). The estimates  of the ,E's use 20 years of annual data covering  the period 1970-1990;  and the
estimates  of the term d/2x uses 1990  data. The debt term (d) is total long term debt owed  to commercial
banks in 1990.
6The evidence  indicates  that when the O's are estimated  using neminal interest  rates, the irequality
is satisfied in about a third of the cases (21 out of 61 countries); using infl tion the inequality  is satisfied
in just under 90 percent of the cases (54 of 61).  Therefore, the past twenty years of data indicate  that
in many  countries  inflation-indexed  debt is more likely to satisfEy  the lower variance  criteria than interest-
rate-inJexed  debt.  Also notice that the estimates  of 0 are typically  sufficiently  large that the question  of
whether (6) is satisfied  does not hinge important!y  on the debt  rm used to compute  d/2x.
7Table 2. Has the inequality  in (6) been  stfisfied?
(annual  dat.,  1970-1990)
EBtiumte  of  Standard  Estimut,  of  Standard
COUNTRY  ,IS  Error  ,6  Ernor  d/2X
AGO ANGOLA  13.64  2.52  10,10  2.45  0.13
ARM.AROENTI  -.52  2.39  -1.33  2.11  1.30
BCR.BULOARI  . 03  1.62  -2.04  1.44  0.34
BOL.BOLIVIA  S.19  3.02  9.19  2.32  U.19
BRA.BRAZII.  2.23  3.04  -5.12  2.22  1.08
JRE,BARBADO  7.10  1.57  2.77  1.76  0,23
CHL.CHILE  4.;0  5.62  -4.46  4.55  0.74
CHN.CHINA  1,45  0.64  0.74  0.56  0.16
CIV.COTE  D'  1.52  1.76  -0.40  1.54  1.10
CMR CAMERCO  5.10  2.63  0.44  2.34  0.20
COO.CONOO  I.Sf,  2.56  5.95  1.65  0.21
COLCOLOMDI  3.'  2.85  1.30  2.51  0.30
CRI.COSTA  R  1.90  1.74  -1.91  1.41  0.08
CSK,CZBCHOS  3.62  1,32  -1.36  1.26  0.1l
CYP.CYPRtIS  -0.40  2.07  -2.S9  1.56  0.16
DOM.DOMINIC  8.19  2.93  -2.04  2.86  0.40
DZA.ALOERIA  3.87  4.80  12,52  2.81  0.28
ECU.ECtIADOR  2.28  3.41  4.94  2.66  1.03
Ffl.IJi  .1877  3.93  40  4.67  0.07
OAB.GABON  2.93  3.40  10  1.93  0.05
OTM.GUATEMA  2.67  2.13  -2.84  1.74  0.11
GUY.GUYANA  9.12  2.88  -1.53  2.91  0.23
HND.HONDURA  0.80  1.71  -2.54  1.30  0.17
HTI.HAI  -0.5St  0.97  -1.53  0.80  0.14
HUN.HUNGARY  1.67  1.11  -0.73  0.96  0.37
IDNINDONES  2.14  3.16  7.54  1.97  0.39
INDINDIA  -1.36  1.36  -2.33  1.01  0.20
IRN.IRAN,  1  5.92  4.87  13.96  2.79  0.07
JAM.JAMAICA  1.42  1.06  -1.83  0.85  0.09
JOR.JORDAN  1.91  1.30  -1.92  1.03  0.25
KEN.KENYA  2.27  1.50  .0.39  1.32  0.39
KOR.K.OREA,  -0.29  1.61  -2.79  1.15  0.11
LBR.LIBERIA  0.97  2.42  -3.16  1.88  0.32
LKA.SRI  LAN  0.83  2.85  -1.70  1.53  0.09
MARMOROCCO  3.08  1.43  -1.90  1.23  0.35
ME.MEXICO  3.66  2.13  1.30  1.91  0.23
MUS.MAURITI  3.07  1.50  -2.25  1.28  0.09
MYS.MALAYSI  2.67  1.10  2.50  0.93  0.10
NER.NIGER  4.03  3.06  -2.42  7.68  0.37
NGA.NIGERIA  4.71  4.81  13.23  2.77  ".30
NIC.NICARAG  4.32  2.64  -2.25  2.31  . I
OMN.OMAN  7.90  5.32  14.76  3.25  0.19
PAN.PANAMA  1.47  1.07  -0.14  1.01  0.47
PER.PERU  6.51  3.46  -0.43  3.31  0.70
PHL.PHI-  '  2.13  2.51  -2.26  2.05  0.40
PNG.PAPUAN  4.08  2.13  -1.25  2.01  0.41
POL.POLAND  1.17  0.77  -0.90  0.63  0.28
PRT.PORTUGA  0.42  1.33  -2.24  0.97  0.34
PRY.PARAGUA  5.83  5.55  -5.38  4.48  0.13
SDN.SUDAN  2.12  2.67  -1.43  2.31  3.48
SLV.EL  SA-V  2.07  2.62  -2.33  2.15  0.10
SYC.SEYC}  2.28  2.51  6.12  1.61  0.07
THA.THAIL'.  5.84  2.31  -1.31  2.22  0.30
7T0.TRINIbA  5.25  2.17  6.29  1.53  0.17
TUN.TUNISIA  2.27  1.09  3.41  0.63  0.06
TUR.TURKEY  -0.32  1.91  *3.33  1.36  0.56
URY.URUGUAY  1.94  3.81  -4.60  2.95  0.22
VEN,VENEZUE  4.03  5.07  13.19  2.97  0.17
YUU.YUJOSLA  -2.45  1.32  -1.31  1.13  0.31
ZAR.ZAIRE  4.28  4.31  -2.73  3.53  0.17
ZWE.ZIMBABW  3.33  2.90  -2.51  2.41  0.13
Using  y to stand  for either a  orp,  p,  - Cov(p,y)/Vaf(y),  correapoiagto  the left  side  of the inequality  in (6). The estimates  of the W's  use  annual  data, 1970-1.
The  term  d/2X is measured  with 1990  data, and corresponds  to the right  of (6).The data summarized  in the precediag section show that the covariance  terms have been large
enough to  make a difference.  Given this evidence, this section presents a  model to  tiirnk more
systematically  about the ultimate sources of co-r.ovements between the key economic variables.  The
model is a closed  economy  model  of the OECD block  which determines  OECD nominai  interest  rates and
inflation  as a function  of exogenous  monetary  policy, fiscal policy and oil price variables.  Developing
economies  ar- linked to this block with the assumption  that their terms of trade respond to the level of
demar.d  in the developed  world.
The model may be seen as a leaner version of more elaborate models suAh  as McKibbin  and
Sachs, 1991. Since  the main  purpose  is expository,  I have  dclberately ehosen simp;ifications  which focus
on the main points.  All of the qualitative  effects which underlie the conclusions  io this paper have been
replicated  with simulations  of the McKibhib  and Sachs model.
To repeat, the model determines  the three main variables of interest, nominal interest rates,
OECD inflation, and the external terms of trade of less developed  countries, and distinguishes  between
short run and long run effects. IThe  exogenous  variables  are an OECD  fiscal variable,  g, a money  supply
variable, m, and world oil prices, pO.  All variabies are in natural logs.
9y  =  f3y - a(i  - p)  + g  (7)
m -p  e  Oy  - xi  (8)
P=Y(Y  - (9)
P,  =  y  (10)
=  -,po.l  (11)
Equation (7) is a semi-reduced  form equilibrium condition for the goods market.  Aggregate
demand on the right hand side is a function of output, the real interest rate, and a fiscal variable.
Equation  (8) is a conventional  money  market equation, where money  demand  depends on output and the
opportunity  cost of holding  money, given  by the nominal interest rate.  Equation  (9) is a simple Phillips
curve that expresses inflation  as a function  of the gap between  current output and potential  outptut. The
assumption  is that the OECD price level, p, cannot jump in response to shocks in the short run, and
instead  adjusts gradually over time according  to (9).  In this sense the model shares the price stickiness
assumption uf static Keynesian models.  Equation (10) (with p, representing the terms of trade of
developing  countries)  embodies  a purely  demand  side view of terms  of trade determination. And equation
(I1) is a production  function where labor and capital are not written explicitly, since they will be held
constant in the experiments. The price of oil is modelled  to reduce potential  output because it is a key
10intermeJaae in OECD economies. This is similai to the way oil prices are treated in Bruno and Sachs
(1985), and is supported  by econometric  evidence  that energy and capital are complements,  (see Berndt
and Wood (1979)).
Although  the main points of the model  will be presented  graphically,  it is worth  documenting  the
algebraic solution in addition.  Treating the long run or steady state solution  first, inflation  is zero by
assumption  and hence  output  equals  potential  output  from equation  (9). Equations  (7) and (8) then  jointly
determine  the long run level of nominal interest  rates and the price level. The full solution  is in equations
(12) to (17) below.
p  =0  (12)
y =  Poil  (13)
Y =  (14)
i  = 1  (g  - (1-p)T)  (15)
p  =  _g  _r[  (1)  +  }  + m  (16)
P,=Y  (17)
Of this set of equations, the most relevant for the question  at hand is the nominal interest rate
11equation (15).  It is worth noting that since inflation is zero, this equation is also a real interest rate
equation.  Note that real interest rates are permanently raised by a  permanent rise in government
spending. The reason is that with output fixed at its full employment  level, the real interest rate must
rise to shift demand from the private sector to the government. A rise in oil prices also raises the real
interest rate in the long run because  it reduces  value-added  output, and with nothing  else changing  on the
demand side, real interest rates must rise to bring demand to this lower level (the term l-$ is assumed
to be a positive  fraction). Finally, a rise in the money supply increases  p proportionally  in the long run
and has no effect on the other variables  of interest.
According  to this model one would not want to borrow at flexible interest rates if a fiscal
expansion  is anticipated,  since this will simply raise OECD interest rates and developing  country debt
service payments. It is also clear that an oil price increase  is the worst of all possible  outcomes  for non-
oil exporting  developing  countries, since both OECD output and developing  country commodity  prices
will fall at the same time that OECD interest rates rise.  If such an event is anticipated,  then fixed rate
borrowing  will at least insulate  developing  countries  from higher future  interest rates. On the other hand,
flexible  rate borrowing  would  be better if oil prices  were expected  to come  down, since the future interest
rate decline would  work in favor of indebted  developing  countries.
Between  steady state's,  the price level is treated as a slowly adjusting variable  whose motion is
governed  by equation (9).  Hence (7) (8) and (9) are solved simultaneously  for output, nominal interest
rates and inflation. The solution  is given below.
P = r(Y  - i)  (18)
-pp,i  (19)
12y  c (m-p)  X(g-cey5)  (20)
ote + A(l  ay)
-(O--eay)(m-p)  + 0(g-ayD)  (21)
ae  + A(1-P-ay)
P,  = Y  (22)
This set of equations  are best suited  to analyze  the short term co-movelr  ts in pc, i.,  and inflation
induced  by the three exogenous  variables. First, by substituting  equation  (22) on the left of equation  (20)
and comparing  this equation  to equation  (21), one can see that shocks  to g cause a positive  co-movement
in developing  country terms of trade and OECD nominal interest rates.  Therefore, if the world were
dominated by fiscal shocks, this pattern would favor developing countries that indexed their debt
payments  to nominal OECD interest rates.  On the other hand, money supply shocks induce a negative
short term co-movement  which works against  developing  countries  whose debt is structured  in this way.
(The term l-0-cYy  is assumed  to be a positive fraction.)
However, note from equation (18) and (22) that OECD inflation  and developing  country terms
of trade always  move in a positive  relation  in the shor. run under either monetary  or fiscal shocks. Hence
this model points out that improved  diversification  may be possible if developing  countries  indexed  debt
payments  to (industrial  country) inflation  rather than nominal interest rates.
The effects of oil shocks  on the co-movements  between  nominal interest rates, inflation  and the
terms  of trade are not as easy to see from equations  (18)-(21). To see the effects more  clearly equations
(22)-(24)  below solve explicitly  for these three variables.
13(a(m-p  + 1(g+ay AP,p,)  +  p  (23)
e  aO + l(1-0-UY)
-(1-p-cty)(m-p)  + e(g+aypPop,)  (25)
ae  + X(l-P-ay)
It is clear from these equations  that oil shocks  will move  all three variables in the same direction. Hence
the short run dynamics provide no basis on which to choose between inflation indexing and nominal
interest rate indexing, but both achieve a positive  co-movement  that fixed rate debt would not achieve.
Having outlined the analytical  solution of the model in both the long and the short run, the
behavior  of the model is summarized  in figures I to 3, with figure I showing  the response  to a permanent
OECD monetary expansion,  figure 2 showing  the response  a permanent  OECD fiscal expansion  and
figure 3 showing  the response  to a permanent  rise in the price cf oil.
143. Summary  of policy  recommendations  from the model.
The policy prescriptions  from such a model regarding  fixed versus flexible rate borrowing can
now be summarized  (see also the summary  in table 3).  It should  be stressed  that these recommendations
take into account only the direction in which the key variables move in response to shocks.  When
recommendations  hinge on favorable  co-movements  between  variables, it is implicitly  assumed  that the
condition in equation (6) is satisfied.
Money  Supply shocks.
If you know that a monetary  expansion  is on the horizon, then flexible  nominal rate borrowing
is oest: you will benefit from the commodity  price boom;  and nominal rates will come down. Fixed rate
borrowing simply  will deprive you of the benefit from falling nominal rates.  Inflation  indexing is even
worse because  inflation  will rise and you will incur higher debt service payments  as inflation  rises.
If you know that a monetary  contraction  is on the horizon, then inflation  indexing  is best: you
will suffer a commodity  price decline no matter what you do; but at least with inflation-indexing  your
debt service payments will come down as inflation  comes down.  In contrast, flexible nominal rate
contracts expose you to higher debt service payments  as nominal  rates rise.  Fixed rate contracts would
not expose you to higher  debt service payments, but would not be as good as inflation  indexing.
If you do not know  which way  OECD monetary  policy will turn, and just want insurance  against
any outcome,  then inflation-indexed  borrowing  is best: the reason is that OECD inflation  and commodity
prices will vary positively in response  to either a monetary  expansion  or contraction. Neither fixed nor
flexible  rate borrowing will achieve  this kind of insurance.
Fiscal shocks.
If you know  that a fiscal expansion  is on the horizon, then fixed nominal rate borrowing  is best:
you will benefit from the commodity  price boom; and lock in at currently low rates now before  they go
up.  Flexible rate borrowing exposes you to interest rate increases both in the short and long term.
15Inflation indexing is not as bad as interest rate indexing because the inflation increase would not be
permanent  (as the interest rate increase  will be), but is still worse than fixed rate borrowing.
If you know that a fiscal contraction  is on the horizon, then flexible nominal rate borrowing is
best: the interest rate decline will cushion the decline in commodity  prices, and you will benefit further
in the long run as interest rates stay low (while commodity  prices recover as OECD output returns to
capacity). Fixed rdte  borrowing will lock you in to temporarily  high interest rates and is therefore a bad
idea. Inflation indexing  is basically  similar to nrminal interest rate indexing in the short run, but is not
as good in the long run because inflation  will not stay low permanently  as will nominal interest rates.
If you do not know  which way OECD fiscal policy  will turn, and just want insurance  against any
outcome, then inflation indexing  is best: the reason is that OECD inflation  and commodity  prices will
have a positive  covariance  under any fiscal shock. Neither fixed  or flexible  rate borrowing  will achieve
this kind of insurance.
Oil price shocks:
Non-oil exporting  developing  countries.
If you know that oil prices will rise, then fixed interest rate contracts are best.  In the long run,
the terms of trade will decline  and interest rates will rise, so that flexible  interest rate borrowiiig  is bad
idea.  Inflation indexing  is less bad than nominal interest rate indexing  because  the rise in inflation  will
not be sustained,  but is still inferior to fixed rate borrowing.
If you know that oil prices will fall, then it is best to contract at flexible interest rates.  In the
long run, the terms  of trade will rise and interest  rates will fall. Since interest rates will fall permanently
while inflation  will not, inflation  indexing  is inferior to nominal interest rate indexing.
When  oil price movements  are uncertain, both forms of indexing  are risky because  the costs can
be quite high if oil prices increase. Hence fixed interest rate contracts  are safer.
Oil-exporting  developing  countries.
16If you know that oil prices will rise then fixed interest rate contracts are best because you will
avoid  paying  higher nominal  interest rates. If you know  that oil prices will decline,  then flexible  interest
rate contracts are best so that you can benefit from lower interest rates. If future oil prices are uncertain,
then note that both oil prices and nominal interest rates vary positively  in both the short and long runs:
hence flexible  interest rate contracts can provide insurance  against large shocks  to real imports.
17Table 3. Summary  of policy recommendations  from the model
Contingencv  Preferred contract
Expansion  flexible i
Money  Contraction  inflation  indexed
Insurance  inflation  indexed
Expansion  fixed i
Fiscal  Contraction  flexible i
Insurance  inflation  indexed
Oil-importing  countries:
Rise  fixed i
Oil Price  Fall  flexible  i
Insurance  fixed i
Oil-exporting  countries:
(  Rise  fixed i
Oil Prkie  Fall  flexible  i
Insurance  flexible  i4. Possible  modifications  to the model.
One possible objection  to the model so far is that equation (10) assumes that the tcrms of trade
of developing countries is solely a function of dtemand  in industrialized countries.  An alternative
approach would be to emohasize  that less developed countries  tend to export commodities  and thus use
a more explicit mode; of commodity  price formation.  For example, under the competitive  model of
commodity  price formation with storage, commodity  prices would be affected  by real interest rates in
addition to other variables.  The reason is that if the commodities  are storable, there is an arbitrage
equation  equating  the required rate of return (real interest rate) with expected  capital  gain in commodity
prices.  Under this model, for a given level of expected  future commodity  prices, a rise in the real
interest rate would depress current commodity  prices (this argument  goes back to Hotelling, 1932).
How would the conclusions  change if this effect (higher real interest rates depressing  the terms
of trade) were added to equation (10)?  First, this change would reinforce the conclusions  regarding
monetary  shocks. The reason is that a monetary  expansion  strongly depresses  real interest rates, raising
commodity  prices at the same time that it raises aggregate  demand.  Hence the real interest rate effect
would reinforce  the demand  effect on the terms of trade.  However, with fiscal shocks the conclusions
would be reinforced in the short run but offset in the long run.  The reason they would be offset is that
a permanent  fiscal expansion  raises real interest rates in the long run, thus lowering commodity  prices
below the level they would obtain in the absence  of the real interest rate effect. Finally, the addition  of
real interest rate effects  on commodity  prices would  offset the demand  effects of oil price shocks. Higher
oil prices depress real interest rates in the short run and raise them in the long run; exactly  the opposite
of the demand  effect.
A second possible  objection  is that the model  only incorporates  the effect of oil prices  on potential
output, to the exclusion  of demand  effects. To the extent that higher  oil prices  raise inflation  and nominal
interest  rates under-adjust  to inflation,  the model  can yield lower real interest rates in response  to oil price
19increases. Since  output in the short run is demand determined,  these lower real rates stimulate  demand
and output. This result of higher oil prices stimulating  OECD output in the short run seems sharply at
odds with the evidence  of the 1970s. To resolve  this issue, oil prices could  be directly  added  to the right
hand side of equation  (7), to depress aggregate  demand through income  or wealth  effects. The effect of
oil prices on output would then depend on the magnitude  of parameters.  However, since none of the
main conclusions  of this paper depend on the short run output effects of oil prices, this modification  is
not pursued.
205. Wealth  effects and access to financing.
Earlier parts of this paper analyzed issues that come into play when countries cannot borrow
freely on  international  capital markets to  finance temporary shocks to  their balance of payments.
Different issues  are relevant  in the intermediate  case where countries  have some access to financing  but
their access is sensitive  to perceptions  about the solvency  of the country by potential  creditors.
When  a country experiences  a decline in export revenues, and the decline is severe enough that
the international  financial  comnimnity  questions  the solvency  of the country, it is important  that the form
of debt contract  the country has adopted  does not exacerbate  the situation  by lowering  the likelihood  that
the country  can obtain  financing. This section  presents  a simple framework  to show how  this car happen,
and then asks what the evidence  of the past 20 years suggests  about the importance  of the form of debt
contract  for this issue.
It is first necessary  to write some model  of how the international  financial  community  evaluates
a country's creditworthiness. For this purpose, assume that potential creditors use the present value
model to evaluate  creditworthiness. That is, they compute  the present discounted  value of exp3rts and
debt service payments on the (admittedly naive) assumption  that variables such as interest rates and
exports will remain constant in the future at current levels.  This provides one possible measure of a
country's capacity  to repay additional  debt, and it is assumed  further that access  to financing  depends on
the difference  between  this computation  of export wealth and debt liability. This procedure  is crude, but
it does have  the virtue of matching  what many  allege  is standard  practice in country  risk analysis  in major
banks.
Concerning  the asset side of this calculation,  let current nominal  exports be given by x(t) and let
the current (and therefore  expected  future)  growth in nominal  exports be r,(t). Using  the current nominal
interest  rate as the discount  rate, nominal  export wealth, W 1 is finite as long as the discount  rate exceeds
export growth,
21W (t)  =  x(t)  > °  (26)
and infinite if export growth exceeds the discount  rate, i(t) - 7r,(t) <  0.
On the other side of the balance  sheet, the countries' liabilities  are the present discounted  value
of expected  future  debt service  payments. These payments  differ according  to the form of debt contract.
Abstracing from several details about the debt contracts, with flexible rate borrowing debt service
payments  would  essentially  be i(t) * D(t), while  under fixed interest  rate borrowing  they would be i * D(t)
and under inflatiosi  indexing  they would be ir(t) * D(t).  The main point to note is that the interest rate
term cancels  out of the present  discounted  value calculation  with flexible  interest rate borrowing  but does
not under the two alternatives:
Under  flexibl  rate: f c  -')' iD ds  = D(t),  (27)
Under  fixed  rate:  e  ez"1 iD  ds  =  D(t),  (28)
i(t)D()(9
Under  an indexed  rate: f e('-') 7rD  ds =(tD(t)  (29)
Combining  these liabilities  with the export wealth  calculation  in (26), the perceived  net worth of
22the country under the three kinds of borrowing (flexible interest rate, fixed interest rate, and inflation
indexed)  can be represented  as follows.
Under  flexible rate:  W =  x  D  (30)
Underfixed rate:  W =  x.  _  - (31)
Under an indexed  rate:  W =  x  _  D  (32)
i-7Cr  ~x 
These calculations are for the case where the interest rate exceeds export growth, which is
precisely the case where solvency  can be questioned. In the other case when export growth is high,
solvency  is less likely to be a real issue.  The important  point to note from equations (30) - (32) is that
the difference  between  them is due to the terms i/i and 7r/i  in (31) and (32). Hence knowing  more about
the relationship  between  shocks  to export wealth and shocks  to these two terms is important  in assessing
the contracts under question.
Annual data was collected on i (nominal LIBOR), 7r (US GNP deflator), x, and 7rt,  for the 61
developing  countries  covering  the years 1970-1990. Export wealth, Wx,  was then calculated  in all cases
where export growth was sufficiently  low, 7rt  <  i.  Since export  growth was typically  higher than i, this
condition reduced the number of usable observations  sufficiently  that it was decided to pool the data
rather than examine individual  countries.  We then look at the conditional distribution  of A(i/i) and
4(7r/i)  given that countries  experienced  negative  shocks  to export wealth (AWnV  <  0).
The reason for conditioning  on the event AWt<0 is that years in which export wealth declined
represent  potential  crisiL  years in which financing  may have been at risk. The debt contract  woulk'  soften
23the blow in these years if liabilities  as perceived  by external financiers  also declined  during these years.
Therefore the more the conditional  density is shifted  to the left, the better.
Figures I and 2 present the empirical frequency  distributions  for the cases of inflation-indexed
and fixed interest rate borrowing (i is set at 0.05).  On the basis of the evidence  from the past 20 years
displayed  in these figures, there are grounds  for slightly  preferring  inflation  indexing  over the other kinds
of borrowing,  but the evidence  is not strong.  The mean of the density in figure I is -0.000103, that of
figure 2 is 0.000815.  Given the standard errors of 0.0011 and 0.0012 respectively, neither mean is
significantly  different from 0 and the means  are not significantly  different from each other.  Therefore,
although  access  to financing  may be an important  concern, there is not strong evidence  from the past 20
years that the form of debt contract affects this significantly.
246. How much difference  would inflation-indexing  have made?
Much of this paper has suggested  that inflation indexing  would have been superior to nominal
interest rate indexir, or fixed interest rate borrowing.  For example, the data in table 2 show that the
condition in (6), namely that Cov(p,j)/Var(j) > d/2x, is satisfied for a larger group of countries when
j = U.S. inflation  than when  j  = U.S. nominal  interest rates. In addition, when the world is dominated
by mon1etary  shocks  emanating  from the high income  economies, the model provides a reason to exect
that the terms of trade in low income economies  will vary together with inflation in the high incoine
economies, but will vary inversely with nominal interest rates in the high income economies. Hence
under monetary shocks, the variance  of equation (2), that is, the variance of z(j) =  px -jd,  should be
lower when  j = inflation  than when  j  = nominal interest  rates, and in this sense inflation  indexing  should
achieve better insurance  for lower income  economies. The z's have welfare significance  because  they
measure the quantity of real imports that a country could purchase without  any external borrowing or
lending.
Given these prior results, the next natural question is the following.  Suppose developing
countries  had their debt indexed  to inflation  rather than  to nominal interest  rates during the past 20 years.
How much  difference  would it have made?  To answer this, z(j) = px -jd was simulated  using actual
data for p, x, and d, combined with six alternatives  for j.  The first three of these were flexible interest
rate simulations,  where  j was the nominal  3-month  government  bond rate for Germany  and Japan and the
3-month  dollar LIBOR rate for the U.S.; and in the remaining  three simulations,  j was GDP-deflator
inflation  for the same three countries  plus a real interest  rate markup. This markup  was set equal to the
average ex-post real interest rate over the period 1970-1990,  using the same interest rates and inflation
rates. Thiese  real interest  rates were 0.035 for Germany,  0.023 for Japan and 0.033 for the United  States.
So for each developing country, six time series using annual data during the period 1970-1990  were
generated  for z(),  corresponding  to j  =  (i 0DrU,iJPN'USA' 7rDEU+O.O 35,IrJPN+O.O 23,rru,+ 0.033).  Finally,
25to eliminate  the trend due to population  growth, each time series of z(j) was divided by population  in the
relevant  developing  country.
To compare the I-vo  broad alternatives  of borrowing  at flexible  nominal  interest rates or inflation
indexing, table 4 reports sample variance ratios of the simulated  z's divided by population. The first
column uses U.S. inflation  and interest rates, the second uses German  data and the third uses Japanese
data. Since in each  column  the numerator  is the variance  for inflation  indexing,  a value  below 1.0 reveals
that inflation  indexing  would  have entailed lower variance than interest rate indexing. The table shows
that there are many countries  where this would have been,  the case, and in some of these the difference
in variance  would  have been substantial. However, there is considerable  dispersion across countries  so
that generalizations  are not very informative. But the table does show that the reduction in variance  from
inflation-indexed  borrowing  can be substantial  for particular countries.
26Table 4. Inflation  indexing  versus interest rate indexing:  variances
V(z(wvA+  033))N(z(j,S))  V(z(wDg  u+ 035))  N(r(6m))  V(z(,w  .023))/N(z(i3)
ARG  0.61  0.94  0.89
BOR  1.03  0.99  0.98
BOL  0.79  0.97  0.86
BRA  0.97  1.23  1.45
CHL  0.89  1.02  1.18
CHN  1.01  1.03  1.05
CiV  0.82  0.86  0.76
CMR  1.12  1.01  1.08
COo  1.28  1.11  1.22
COL  0.90  1.05  1.27
CR]  0.60  0.83  0.75
CSK  1.05  1.01  1.03
DOM  0.79  0.92  0.77
DZA  1.12  1.05  1.13
ECU  1.01  1.04  1.10
FJI  0.96  0.99  0.94
GAB  0.96  1.00  0.98
GTM  0.91  0.95  0.90
GUY  0.88  0.91  0.82
HND  0.85  0.87  0.80
HTI  1.09  0.99  1.12
HUN  1.12  1.12  1.19
IDN  1.10  1.09  1.20
IND  1.02  1.38  2.19
IRN  1.00  1.00  1.00
JAM  0.69  0.75  0.70
JOR  1.13  1.10  1.21
KEN  0.83  0.87  0.75
KOR  1.02  1.02  1.04
LBR  0.93  0.94  0.89
LKA  1.08  1.06  1.45
MAR  0.69  0.87  0.71
MEX  1.65  1.42  1.70
MUS  1.00  1.01  1.02
MYS  1.04  1.04  1.08
NER  0.93  0.93  0.93
NOA  0.98  0.99  0.98
NIC  0.86  0.88  0.75
PAN  1.09  1.07  1.14
PER  0.96  0.94  1.01
PHL  0.74  0.91  0.76
PNG  0.92  1.02  0.80
POL  1.01  1.18  1.27
PRT  0.99  1.03  1.06
PRY  0.99  1.04  1.08
SLV  0.89  0.94  0.90
SYC  1.03  1.05  1.06
THA  1.00  1.04  1.06
rTO  0.98  0.97  0.95
TUN  1.16  1.16  1.26
TUR  1.09  1.08  1.14
URY  0.97  1.04  1.35
VEN  0.99  1.01  0.99
ZAR  0.94  0.93  0.84
ZWE  0.93  0.94  0.88
Averge  0.97  1.01  1.047. Summary  and main conclusions.
This paper basically attempts  to answer the following  question. Does theory and the evidence
from the past twenty  years provide  grounds  for thinking  that developing  countries  can affect the variance
of real imports  soley by altering  the way debt is paid? The answer is a qualified  yes.  More specifically,
the paper makes the following  points.
The paper first shows that if there is a presumption  that fixed rate debt is less risky than flexible
rate debt, then this presumption  is historically  inaccurate. For many developing  countries, using annual
data over the period 1970-1990,  the relevant covariance  terms are sufficiently  large that flexible rate
borrowing can actually reduce overall risk.  This statement is true whether debt service payments are
indexed  to industrial-country  nominal  intelest rates or inflation. But it is noteworthy  that the covariance
terms are larger and more often positive  with inflation  than with nominal interest rates.
The paper then presents a macro-model  of the industrialized  countries  to organize thinking  about
the co-movements  of these variables in response to shocks.  The terms of trade of less developed
countries  are linked to this model by the assumption  that the level of demand in industrialized  countries
positively  affects their terms of trade. The model rules out causality  running from the terms of trade of
developing  countries to the indistrialized  country  equilibrium.
The worst case scenario for  many developing countries is flexible interest rate borrowing
combined  with a monetary  contraction  in the industrialized  world. A monetary  contraction  raises nominal
interest rates, reduces inflation  and reduces  the terms of trade of developing  countries. As happened in
the early 1980s,  developing  countries  whose  debt service payments  depend  on nominal  interest rates will
suffer because  the terms of trade decline  at the same time that debt service  payments  rise.  To the extent
that countries  wish to avoid this scenario, either fixed interest rate debt or inflation  indexing  would be
preferable  to borrowing  at flexible  nominal interest rates.
More generally, paper points out that to reduce risk countries  should seek debt contracts where
28debt payments vary positively with their terms of trade.  Several of the results in this paper point to
inflation-indexed  debt as being desirable  on this score.
First, using eata from the period 1970-1990,  the covariance  between  developing  country terms
of trade data and OECD inflation is generally positive and larger than the covariance using nominal
interest rates.  Second, the model offers a  reason for this observation.  Nominal interest rates in
industrialized  countries should vary inversely with monetary shocks in industrialized  countries, but
inflation  in industrialized  countries  and the terms  of trade of developing  countries  should -ary positively
with monetary shocks. To the extent that this kind of monetary shock was part of the mix of shocks
affecting  the world economy  in the past twenty  years, the stronger positive  relation between  developing
country terms of trade data and OECD inflation  than with OECD interest rates is not surprising.  Third,
simulations  using actual data indicate  that many  developing  countries  could have achieved  less variation
in their imports if all of their debt was inflation-indexed  rather than nominal interest rate indexed.
It is also worth pointing  out what the paper  does not do.  First, the paper examines  effects on the
variance  of real imports  rather than the mean  or other aspects  of the distribution. This is not to deny that
higher mean import purchases would be beneficial, instead it reflects scepticism  that there is anythinig
constructive  too add on this issue. Of course, if countries  could lock-in  their debt at a very low rate, then
they snould do so.  But there is no strong reason to think that developing  countries  can out-forecast  their
creditors about the future path of interest  rates. Second, the paper examines  only extreme  options:  either
the debt is all inflation  indexed,  all interest rate indexed  or all fixed rate debt.  The reason for doing so
is to bring out the contrasts between these options.  It should be clear that the optimal strategy would
probably  entail all three kinds of borrowing.
Finally, the paper does not analyze the issues from the perspective  of the creditor banks, and
therefore does not fully examine risk sharing issues.  For example, it may be the case that creditors
wouw-  welcome  the introduction  of inflation-indexed  bonds as an additional  asset to minimize  their own
29risk, (these are not widely available in industrialized  countries)  and thus there may be some scope for
more efficient  international  risk sharing.
30Figure 1.  The time oath of nominal interest rates. inflation  and commodity  price
in response  to a permanent monetary  expansion  in the OECD.
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